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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ANDREW OWENS MALLERY,

:

Case No. 20010555-CA

:

Priority No. 2 (incarcerated)

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this case
involving a conviction of first degree felony entered in a court of record and transferred
to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court.
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
1. Did the trial court err in denying Mallery's motion to suppress based on the
police violation of Mallery's rights against unreasonable search and seizure?
This Court reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear error and conclusions
of law for correctness. See, e ^ , State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f7, 17 P.3d 1135.
This issue was preserved by pretrial motion (R. 59-63), which was ruled on by the
trial court (R. 159-164).

1

2. Did the trial court err in denying Mallery's motion to suppress eyewitness
identification?
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal analysis to the eyewitness
identification issue presents a legal question to be reviewed without deference, for
correctness. See State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 942-43 (Ut. App. 1997).
In reviewing the reliability of the eyewitness identification, the Court grants trial
courts a measure of discretion. See State v. Perry. 899 P.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Utah App.
1995). The court reviews the record to determine from the totality of circumstances
whether the identification was consistent with Article I §7 of the Utah Constitution. State
v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error,
but the ultimate legal conclusion of reliability is one of law, to be reviewed for
correctness. See id.
This issue was preserved by pretrial motion (R. 56-57), which was denied by the
trial court (R. 159-164).
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statute and constitutional provisions pertain:
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
2

and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of itizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its juridiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State charged Mallery and co-defendant Jesus Isreal Rosillo by information
with one count of aggravated robbery (R. 5-6).
Through counsel, Mallery moved the court to suppress eyewitness identification
(R. 56-57).
Mallery moved to suppress evidence found as a result of the search of Mallery and
3

his home (R. 59-63).
Judge Hanson denied the motions to suppress in a minute entry directing the
prosecution to draft detailed findings and conclusions (R. 159-164).
No findings or conclusions were submitted or entered.
Following a trial, the jury convicted Mallery as charged, and indicated on their
verdict that he used a firearm in the commission of the aggravated robbery (R. 216).
Judge Hanson sentenced Mallery to a term of six years to life at the Utah State
Prison (R. 254-55).
Counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 262).
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court (R. 268).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On August 18, 2000, at about 2:00 a.m., Steven Lund stopped at the Ute Car Wash
on 300 South and 300 East, to clean out the van he was driving for the Embassy Hotel (R.
273 at 141). Two people approached, and one Lund later identified as Mallery was
holding a black handgun, at about waist level and pointing it at Lund, and then the other
robber, whom Lund later identified as Rosillo, demanded money (R. 273 at 147-48, 150).
When Lund pulled out a bundle of cash, Rosillo demanded more money, and Lund then
1

Counsel for Mallery first states the facts as they were established at trial, to
give this Court an understanding of how he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of
his motions to suppress.
In the argument portion of the brief, he will then summarize the facts established
at the evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress. While this second summary is
redundant to the evidence at trial in many respects, counsel for Mallery sets it forth
separately, because this was the evidence available to the trial court at the time of his
ruling denying the motions to suppress.
4

gave him his wallet containing cash, credit card, and Lund's driver's license and library
card (R. 273 at 147-48). He gave them $330 (R. 273 at 150).
There was a light directly overhead, and the robbers were about five feet from
Lund (R. 273 at 151). The event was surprising, stressful and frightening (R. 273 at 171).
Lund saw them walking away as he continued vacuuming, and the last time he saw
them, they were walking off the carwash property (R. 273 at 148, 172, 182). About
fifteen seconds later, Lund got in the van and called the hotel operator on his two-way
radio, and asked her to call the police (R. 273 at 149-150).
He described the robbers as being two Hispanic males with black hair and dark
skin (R. 273 at 173-74). They were in their late teens or early twenties and thin (R. 273 at
174). He said the person with a gun had a dark baseball cap and the other person had a
blue sweatshirt (R. 273 at 174). He said they were about five feet ten inches tall (R. 273
at 152). He did not mention any facial hair or distinctive logos on their clothing, or
describe their pants or shoes (R. 273 at 174-175).
The police were stopping all suspects in the area, including at least two who were
not charged (R. 273 at 195).
Angie Renteria, Salt Lake City Police dispatcher, was present in the Salt Lake City
Public Safety Building located at 315 East 200 South, on the fifth floor in the northeast
corner of the building (R. 273 at 184-185). She overheard Lund's robber/ over the
dispatch radio, and expected the robbers, who had been walking northbound from the
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carwash, to come by her office (R. 273 at 186). She watched out her window and saw
two males in dark clothing, one of whom was wearing a baseball cap, walk out of an
apartment building apparently located at 228 South 300 East and get into a Ute Cab
(R.273 at 187, 214). A dispatch operator called the cab's dispatcher and asked where the
two men were heading, and Renteria saw the cab heading northbound on 3rd East (R. 273
at 188).
The dispatch operator broadcast a report that two suspects matching the robbers'
descriptions were in a cab, and gave the location and intended destination of the cab (R.
273 at 188).
Jeffrey Carter of the Salt Lake City Police Department had a description of the
gunman as a male Hispanic, twenty years old, five feet ten inches tall, thin, with a dark
baseball cap (R. 273 at 213). He momentarily detained two people on second east and
second south, but released them after determining that they were probably not involved
(R. 273 at 196-199). He then heard a dispatch report that a Ute Cab number 42 had
picked up two males from an apartment building between the car wash and police station,
and was headed toward 700 North and Redwood Road (R. 273 at 199-201). Carter
found the cab on North Temple and State Street and called for backup (R. 273 at 200201).
The police stopped the cab after it turned west to go west on North Temple (R.
273 at 202). With at least four police units present, Officers Carter and Hamideh
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approached the cab and had the occupants in the backseat exit the cab (R. 273 at 203).
Carter patted down Jesus Rosillo, searched him and found $171 in cash (R. 273 at 203204). One of the suspects was wearing a baseball cap, police found another cap in the cab
(R. 273 at 212). One cap was red and one was blue (R. 273 at 212).
Officer Hamideh testified that when they stopped the cab, they ordered the
passengers to put their hands out the window because of the gun used in the robbery
(R.274 at 234). The suspects complied with this command, and Hamideh informed
Mallery that he considered him armed and dangerous (R. 274 at 234). Hamideh had
Mallery lace his fingers behind his head, and grabbed Mallery and held him as he frisked
him for weapons (R. 274 at 235). Hamideh did not feel a weapon, but did feel a
rectangular object in a pocket (R. 274 at 235).
Hamideh took Mallery to the back of Hamideh's patrol car and asked his name,
which he provided accurately (R. 274 at 236). Hamideh asked if he had photo
identification, and when Mallery said he did not, Hamideh asked what was in his right
rear pocket (R. 274 at 236). Mallery said it was his wallet, and Hamideh asked if he
minded if Hamideh pulled it out (R. 274 at 236). Mallery replied, "No," and Hamideh
asked, "No, I can't pull that out?" Mallery replied, "Go ahead, take it." (R. 274 at 236).
The rectangle was a bundle containing $169 in cash and Mr. Lund's driver's license,
credit card and other cards and papers (R. 274 at 237-243).
Hamideh described Mallery as having facial hair and a tan at the time of the arrest,
7

and said he looked Hispanic (R. 274 at 244-45). Mallery's shirt and cap both had some
type of logos on them, which were not mentioned in the suspect description (R. 274 at
251).
Officer Zane Swim spoke with a male and female in front of the apartments where
the suspects caught the cab, and then Swim went in to investigate (R. 274 at 264). He
initially received word from dispatch that the suspects had gone into and left apartment
20, but after awakening the resident of that apartment and then receiving an additional
dispatch, the officers went to apartment 22 shortly before 3:00 a.m. (R. 274 at 265-266).
The police obtained permission from Yolanda Vetone Nava to search the apartment for
evidence of a crime her husband, Jesus, may have been involved in (R. 274 at 266). In a
closet containing a water heater, he found a gun and Mr. Lund's wallet (R. 274 at 267).
There was no evidence presented tying Lund to the apartment, and there was no
fingerprint evidence presented.
After Lund returned to the hotel, perhaps fifteen minutes after the robbery, he
overheard the police dispatch indicating that they had arrested two suspects, had searched
two suspects, and had found Lund's property in the course of their searches of the
suspects (R. 273 at 175-176).
The police made no effort to conduct a photospread or lineup (R. 273 at 219).
Officer Hawk took Lund in his police car to North Temple and West Temple,
where there were two men in custody and surrounded by at least half a dozen police
8

officers, and several police cars with red flashing lights (R. 273 at 159-160, 177). The
police had blocked traffic out of the vicinity (R. 273 at 216). Officer Hawk shone his
spotlight on the two handcuffed suspects from about forty feet away, and Lund
immediately identified them as the suspects (R. 273 at 161, 177). He said that Mallery,
who was wearing a blue pullover shirt and a backwards red baseball cap, was the gunman
(R. 273 at 162).
Lund saw Mallery again in a patrol car with some police officers, and later
identified Mallery at a lineup on October 12, 2000, and also saw him at other hearings (R.
273 at 163, 178).
Mallery is Caucasian (R. 273 at 179, 213).
Lund said that the gun found in proximity to his wallet looked similar to the one
used in the robbery (R. 273 at 152, 159). He also identified various items kept in his
wallet and recovered by the police from Mallery (R. 273 at 154-155).
Summary of Argument
The trial court erred in denying the motions to suppress.
The police were not legally justified in stopping the cab and immediately treating
the occupants as though they were under arrest, absent probable cause. The information
available to the police did not give rise to reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause.
The officer was not justified in demanding to know the contents of Mallery's
wallet, and this conduct amounted to a search.

9

Any consent given was tainted by the preceding illegalities.
Lund's identification of Mallery was the product of suggestion. While there are
multiple cases affirming identifications stemming from show-ups, none involved the level
of suggestiveness involved here, where the alleged victim was informed prior to the
show-up that the police not only had two suspects under arrest, but also had found on the
suspects his property taken during the robbeiy.
Argument
I.
FACTS ESTABLISHED AT EVIDENTIARY HEARING
AND RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
A. HEARING FACTS
1. THE ROBBERY
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Steven Lund testified that as he was
vacuuming the Embassy Suites Hotel van at the Ute Carwash on 3rd East and 3rd South at
about 2 a.m. on August 18, 2000 (R. 272 at 65-66). He noticed two males behind him
standing about five feet awayfromhim. One was holding a gun, wearing a red baseball
cap and a blue sweatshirt, and the other was wearing a tan shirt. They were both wearing
jeans (R. 272 at 66). One held the gun on him, while the other demanded money. After
he gave them money, the one without the gun demanded more, and he gave him his wallet
(R. 272 at 67).
The suspects headed north on foot (R. 272 at 68).
The robbery lasted ten to fifteen seconds and the lighting was good (R. 272 at 67).
10

He got a good look at their faces and focused on them (R. 272 at 68). They headed north
on foot (R. 272 at 68). He had been awake since about noon the day before., and
normally works a shift from 5 p.m. to 2 a.m. (R. 272 at 68).
Lund turned around for a moment, and then drove off in the van and used the twoway radio to call the hotel and ask them to call the police (R. 272 at 69). Officer Hawk,
who was working for Embassy Suites, was present when he anived at the hotel (R. 272 at
69).
Lund talked to dispatch on the phone, and provided a description five to ten
minutes after the robbery (R. 272 at 70).
He first claimed that he provided a more thorough and accurate description to
dispatch, but after hearing the dispatch tape, conceded that he did not say that the
baseball cap was red, or that they were wearing jeans or a tan shirt (R. 272 at 79). He told
the dispatcher that the robbers were Hispanic, but acknowledged that Mallery is
Caucasian (R. 272 at 81).
2. THE TRAFFIC STOP, ARRESTS. AND SEARCHES
Dispatch operator Angie Renteria testified that from her office at 315 East 200
South, kitty corner and down a bit southwest, she saw two males coming out of an
apartment building and get into a Ute Cab, so she had an operator call the cab and get a
description of the passengers, the cab number, and their intended destination (R. 272 at 56, 12). The dispatch operator apparently confirmed that the cab contained two hispanics
(R. 272 at 15). A dispatcher subsequently broadcast the cab number and its intended
11

destination (R. 272 at 8).
The suspect information from Lund was that there were two male Hispanic
suspects in their late teens or early twenties, one wearing a dark ball cap and one wearing
a blue shirt (R. 272 at 6, 10). The crime occurred at 300 East and 300 South, and the
suspects were supposedly heading northbound (R. 272 at 7).
The police were stopping everyone in the neighborhood, and detained at least one
other couple of suspects (R. 272 at 12).
Jeffrey Carter testified that the description was two male Hispanics, one with a
blue sweatshirt, one with a baseball cap, one of whom had used a gun (R. 272 at 18). He
stopped two other males on 200 South and 200 East (R. 272 at 18). Carter located the
cab number 42, in accordance with the dispatch, and he stopped it with Officer
Hamideh's help (R. 272 at 18-20). Hamideh was in a separate car (R. 272 at 33).
They directed the passengers to stick their hands out the window and Hamideh
informed them that they were considered armed and dangerous (R. 272 at 20). Carter had
his gun out during the arrest (R. 272 at 34).
Carter frisked Rosillo and found no weapons, but cuffed him (R. 272 at 35). Other
officers found Mr. Lund's identification on Mallery (R. 272 at 36). Mallery was also
cuffed (R. 272 at 37).
There were about five police cars, and at least that many officers surrounding the
suspects during the showup (R. 272 at 38).
Carter could not recall if Mallery and Rosillo were moved out for a clearer
12

viewing when Lund arrived (R. 272 at 39).
Carter thought Mallery looked Caucasian, not Hispanic (R. 272 at 25).
Carter was dispatched at 2:08, stopped the first two pedestrians at 2:10, got
information about the Ute cab at about 2:21 or four or five minutes earlier (R. 272 at 28).
He had information that there were two Hispanic males, and that the gunman was about
five foot ten inches and about 20 years old and wearing a dark baseball cap (R. 272 at
29). The other suspect was wearing a blue sweatshirt (R. 272 at 29). There was no other
information about the clothing of the gunman (R. 272 at 32).
During the show-up, Mallery and Rosillo were cuffed, separated, and standing
outside cars, and the car that brought the victim came within fifty or a hundred feet (R.
272 at 22-23).
Hamideh was waiting in the police parking lot, thinking the suspects might come
running north on 300 East (R. 272 at 43). He heard about the cab, and he went and
stopped the car with Carter, and his police car lights were on during the stop (R. 272 at
43, 49). They had the suspects roll down their windows and stick their hands out (R. 272
at 43). He instructed Mallery to lace his fingers behind his head as he exited the car, and
Hamideh did a weapon s frisk (R. 272 at 44).
Hamideh found no weapons and told Mallery that he matched the description of a
robbery suspect and cuffed him for his own safety (R. 272 at 44-45). In conducting the
frisk, he felt something rectangular like an identification card or a wallet (R. 272 at 45).
Hamideh walked Mallery to the back of Hamideh5 s car and asked him what his name
13

was, and when Mallery identified himself accurately, Hamideh asked for photo
identification (R. 272 at 45-46). Hamideh asked him what was in his rear right pants
pocket and Mallery said it was his wallet (R. 272 at 46). Hamideh asked him if he
minded if he took it out, and Mallery said no (R. 272 at 46). Hamideh asked, "No, I can't
take it out?" and Mallery answered "Oh, okay, take it out." (R. 272 at 46). Hamideh
pulled it out and it was a stack of cards and cash and Steven Lund's driver's license (R.
272 at 46). Hamideh could tell that Mallery was not the person depicted on the license,
so he asked dispatch the name of the victim, and learned that it was Lund (R. 272 at 4647).
At that point, Mallery interjected, "I found the wallet." (R. 272 at 47). Other
officers took custody of Mallery (R. 272 at 47-48).
He cuffed Mallery before asking him what was in his pocket (R. 272 at 45)
Hamideh believed Mallery was Caucasian (R. 272 at 52). Rosillo was Hispanic
(R. 272 at 53).
Officer Zane Swim went to the apartment at 228 South and 300 East and found
two people embracing in front (R. 272 at 56, 61). They said two people had gone into
the apartments, but Swim made no record of their description of these people (R. 272 at
60). He went inside to apartment 20 and found that the occupant was not involved in the
robbery (R. 272 at 56). They then learned from the Ute Cab caller ID that the apartment
in issue was 22 (R. 272 at 57).
The police spoke with Yolanda Vitale-Nofa in Spanish, confirmed that her
14

husband had been in the apartment and then left, and obtained her consent to search for
evidence that he had been involved in a robbery (R. 272 at 58). He opened a sliding door
to the water heater and furnace and found a gun and wallet sitting behind the water heater
(R. 272 at 59).
The white woman who answered the door referred to Rosillo's wife as the person
living in the apartment, and Swim made no effort to see who was on the lease or to ask
who was living in the apartment (R. 272 at 63).
The two people on the lawn in front of the apartments said that two people ran into
the building and ran out shortly thereafter (R. 272 at 64).
3. THE SHOWUP
About fifteen minutes after the robbery, Lund was taken to about 50 West North
Temple (R. 272 at 70). There were two men in custody, surrounded by four or five
police officers and their cars (R. 272 at 70). The men were cuffed, standing some ten feet
apart from one another, and surrounded by police, some thirty or forty feet from Lund (R.
272 at 71, 72). As they pulled up and Hawk turned on his spotlight, Lund told Hawk,
"That's them." (R. 272 at 71-72). He could distinguish then between the gunman and the
other man, and identified Mallery as the gunman (R. 272 at 72-73).
Before going to the showup, he had been listening to Officer Hawk's radio, and
knew that the police had arrested and searched the two suspects, and that they were found
to be in possession of his identification and other property (R. 272 at 80).
He also saw Mallery in the back of a police car later, when he was going to
15

retrieve some of his property, which the police had recovered (R. 272 at 73).
He also identified Mallery in a lineup in the jail (R. 272 at 74).
He was certain of the identification (R. 272 at 74).
B. TRIAL COURT RULING
The trial court's minute entry provides, in relevant part,
The Court determined that the search of the residence at 228 South
300 East was with permission of the occupant, and that there was no
constitutional infirmity with regard to that search. During that search, the
victim's wallet and a firearm that matched the description of the firearm
used in the armed robbery were located. The Court therefore denied the
defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained during the search of
the residence.
The Court further determined that the search of the defendant's
person, assuming the detention was otherwise appropriate, at the scene of
the location where the police officers stopped the cab in which the
defendant and co-defendant were riding, was with the defendant's consent.
Further, the Court ruled that the initial stop of the cab in which the
defendant and the co-defendant were riding was appropriate. The Court
determined that the officers had at least an articulable suspicion regarding
the occupants of the cab as being involved in the robbery which they were
investigating.
Finally, the Court ruled at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing
that the initial show-up and identification of the defendant as one of the two
that were involved in the robbery where Mr. Lund was the victim was
proper. The Court determined that there was no inappropriate suggestion
on the part of the police officers. The victim, Mr. Lund, not only made an
immediate positive identification of the defendant and the co-defendant as
being the persons who robbed him a few moments before at the Ute Car
Wash on 300 East and 300 South, but has remained consistent in that
identification through various court hearings and a line-up after the
defendant's arrest.
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Suppress the initial
identification of him by the victim at the scene of the stop is denied.
After considering the position of the parties, the Court is satisfied
that the detention and the manner of detention, including the length of
detention of the defendant after the initial stop, but after the defendant was
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out of the cab, the police not only had a continued articulable suspicion, but
had additional facts to constitute probable cause so as to believe that the
defendant was involved in the robbery at the Ute Car Wash a few minutes
before.
The defendant Mallery was found wearing a baseball cap as was
reported to the police officers. The defendant matched the build and height
given as identification of the perpetrators of the robbery, and the defendant
came from the immediate area of the robbery in the cab just a few minutes
after the robbery occurred. The age of both the defendant and the
codefendant Rosillo matched the description given by the victim, Mr. Lund.
In addition to all the foregoing that created probable cause for the officers
to believe that the defendant had been involved in a robbery a few minutes
before at the Ute Car Wash, there was additional information after the
defendant voluntarily agreed to have his person searched by the police
officer, where identification and other documents relating to the victim, Mr.
Lund, were located. Those documents found in the voluntary search of the
defendant's person serve to increase the quantity of information available to
the police officers to create additional probable cause regarding the
defendant Mallery.
The nature of the detention was reasonable to effect the purpose of
the stop and, taking into account the nature of the crime being investigated,
the manner of the detention was appropriate as well. The officers detained
the defendant and co-suspect, Rosillo, near the location of the stop to see if
they could be identified by the victim, and such a procedure is proper. The
victim was close and the detention would be of short duration. The fact
that the defendant was handcuffed while being detained by the police
officers, while not usually called for, is appropriate under the circumstances
where a crime being investigated was a crime involving the use of a
firearm.
Accordingly, the defendant's complaint that he was improperly
detained after the initial stop in an unreasonable manner for an
unreasonable length of time, so as to void the initial identification or void
the voluntary search of the defendant's person, are without substance and as
previously indicated, denied.
(R. 159-163).
II.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE SUPPRESSED
ALL EVIDENCE RESULTING FROM THE ILLEGAL
ARREST AND SEARCH OF MALLERY.
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
"The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 'right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.5" United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989).
Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution provides protection at least as broad as the
Fourth Amendment, and is at times construed to provide broader protection. See State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)(plurality). See also State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d
415, 418 (Utah 1991)(recognizing privacy interest in bank records under Article I section
14).
The tripartite Fourth Amendment analysis of police-citizen encounters is
succinctly set forth in United States v. Armijo, 781 F. Supp. 1551 (D. N.M. 1991), as
follows:
There are three different levels of police-citizen encounters, each
requiring different degrees of Fourth Amendment scrutiny: consensual
encounters, Terry stops, and arrests. Often the lines between these
police-citizen encounters are blurred and in some instances,. . . can rapidly
escalate through all three levels.
The first, a consensual police-citizen encounter, is characterized by
the voluntary cooperation of a citizen in response to non-coercive
questioning. Since courts have found this to be a de minimis intrusion not
amounting to a seizure, this type of encounter does not warrant Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. "[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police
officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a
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reasonable person would feel free fto disregard the police and go about his
business,... the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is
required." "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Thus, "the crucial test is whether,
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the
police conduct would have 'communicated to a reasonable person that he
was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'"
If a reasonable person would not feel free to ignore the police
presence, the encounter escalates into a Terry stop, characterized as a
"brief, non-intrusive detention during afriskfor weapons or preliminary
questioning. ..." "It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs
'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house
and prosecution for crime — 'arrests' in the traditional terminology. It must
be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains hisfreedomto walk away, he has 'seized' that person."
Although this is considered a seizure of the person within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it need not be supported by probable
cause. Rather, in order to justify an investigatoiy stop, the officer need have
only "specific and articulable facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable
suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime."
"Anything less would invite intrusions upon the constitutionally guaranteed
rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result
this Court has consistently refused to sanction."
Police may not, in the name of investigating a person who is no more
than suspected of criminal activity, carry out a full search of the person, his
automobile or other effects. Nor may the police detain an individual's
luggage unless the officer can articulate specific facts sufficient to give rise
to reasonable suspicion the traveler's luggage contains contraband. More
importantly, the police may not seek to verify their suspicions by means
approaching the conditions of arrest. The investigative methods employed
should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time.
If the intrusiveness of the investigation increases, the encounter
escalates into an arrest which is characterized by highly intrusive or
lengthy search or detention. An arrest is justified only when there is
probable cause to believe a person has committed or is committing a crime.
"Probable cause to arrest exists where facts and circumstances within the
arresting officer's knowledge and of which they have reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of
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reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed
by the person to be arrested."
Id. at 1555-56 (citations omitted). Accord. State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353 at ^ 12, 17
P.3dll35, 1139.
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional law, Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15
defines the prerequisite and limits of an investigative detention, stating,
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
In the instant matter, the conduct of the police in taking Mallery and Rosillo out of
the cab with at least one gun drawn, frisking them, cuffing them, telling Mallery
incorrectly that he matched the description of a robber, and demanding to know what was
in Mallery's pocket after Mallery had already identified himself (R. 272 at 34-46),
constituted an arrest, requiring proof of probable cause. See, e.g.. Armijo; Hansen,
supra. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15, supra. See also Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491,
499 (1983)( "In the name of investigating a person who is not more than suspected of
criminal activity, the police may not carry out a full search of the person or of his
automobile or other effects. Nor may the police seek to verify their suspicions by means
that approach the condition of an arrest.").
Hamideh's conduct in demanding to know what was in Mallery's pocket went
beyond the limits of a Terryfrisk,and constituted an invasion of Mallery's legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of his pocket, or in other words, a search, requiring
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proof of both probable cause and exigent circumstances. See e ^ State v. Whittenback
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980)(officer's command that suspect empty his pockets
constituted a search). See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64-65 (1968)(search
for evidence exceeds Terry pat-down); United States v. Santillanes. 848 F.2d 1103, 1109
(10th Cir. 1988)(officer's search of contents of defendant's pockets exceeded proper
Terry frisk).2
At the time of the arrest, the police suspected that two Hispanic males had taken a
cab from an apartment in the general vicinity of the crime, in an area and at a time when
there were other citizens in the neighborhood (R. 272 at 5-6, 12, 15). They had no
information that the cab suspects' clothing, height or weight matched the description of
the robbers, and significantly, one of the passengers of the car was in fact Caucasian, not
Hispanic.
These circumstances established mere proximity to the crime, which does not give
rise to reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause. See State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85
(Utah App. 1987)(no reasonable suspicion existed to justify stop of men at 3:30 a.m. in
high crime area, when one of them made furtive gesture to hide knapsack); State v.
Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985)(no reasonable suspicion existed to justify stop of
2

Under Article I § 14 of the Utah Constitution, to justify a warrantless search,
the police must establish both probable cause and exigent circumstances. See e^g. State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1996). Exigent circumstances exist only when a
reasonable person would believe that police actions are required to prevent harm to
police, other people or evidence, or that some other event would occur to thwart police
efforts. See e j . State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993).
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two men walking three blocksfromburglary at 1:40 a.m., who were described in the area
by another police officer two hours prior); State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah
19&6)(per curiam)(slow\y moving vehicle, with out of state plates, in neighborhood in
which a number of burglaries had occurred, without more, is insufficient to support
reasonable suspicion to justify detention of the occupants thereof). See also Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968)(policeman did not have probable cause to arrest
suspect observed approaching and interacting with several known drug addicts over a
period of eight hours); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)(police executing search
warrant for tavern and bartender for drugs had no basis for Terry frisk of bar patron);
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)("In short, appellant's activity was no different
from the activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood. The fact that appellant was in
a neighborhoodfrequentedby drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding
that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct.").
The trial court's analysis of the search and seizure issues was incorrect in many
respects. As was explained above, the police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify
a stop, let alone probable cause to justify the arrests. See, e.g., Trujillo, supra.
Assuming that the initial stop was justified, once the police realized that Mallery
was Caucasian and wearing a red cap, rather than Hispanic and wearing a dark cap as the
robber supposedly was, they should have released the suspects.

See, e.g.. City of St.

George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah App. 1997)(in course of detention, officer's
actions must efficiently confirm or dispel suspicion, or scope of detention is violated).
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The Terry frisk of Mr. Mallery was illegal because the police lacked reasonable
suspicion to believe that Mr. Mallery, a Caucasian wearing a red cap, was the suspect that
they were looking for, let alone that he was armed or that the safety of the officer or
others was in danger. State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993)(tcthere must be
separately established reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior when the frisk takes
place as well as a reasonable basis for believing there exists a danger to officers or others
in the vicinity."); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985)(police Terry frisk of burglary
suspect upheld when person searched matched description, encounter occurred within
thirty minutes of burglaiy within one block of crime, and police observed a large bulge in
front pocket).
The trial court erred in relying on the contents of Mallery's pocket in his probable
cause analysis, because the search of Mallery's pocket was unlawful. See, e.g.,
Whittenback, supra.
The trial court erred in ruling that the search of Mallery's pocket was consensual,
because the circumstances of the arrest were so coercive, and because any consent given
by Mallery was clearly the product of the preceding illegalities in the unlawful stop and
arrest, frisk, and the search of his pocket which occurred when Hamideh demanded to
know the contents of the pocket. See State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah
1995)("[W]hen a consensual search is preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation, the
evidence obtained from the search must be excluded unless the state proves the consent
was voluntary and that it was not obtained by exploiting the violation."). As the court
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explained in State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), "a defendant's consent to a
search following illegal police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment only if both
of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii) the consent
was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Id. at 1262. The
government bears the burden of proof. E.g., id. at 1263.
In assessing voluntariness, the Court should consider all facts and circumstances,
focusing on the nature of the police conduct and the personal characteristics of the
accused. Id. at 1263. In assessing attenuation, the Court should consider "'the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct,' the 'temporal proximity' of the illegality and
the consent, and 'the presence of intervening circumstances.'" Id. at 1263 (citation
omitted).
This Court can readily determine that the police conduct here, in pulling two men
out of a cab at gunpoint, telling them they were considered armed and dangerous, and
frisking and searching the men, who were surrounded by many officers and police cars, is
coercive conduct. See id. The government presented no evidence that Mallery was a
hardened criminal, or otherwise immune to the naturally coercive effects of such
treatment by the police. Cf State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353 at 1f 24, 17 P.3d 1135,
1144 ("Here, as in Robinette, the intrusive and suspicious questions asked by the officer,
combined with the fact that the questions were asked immediately after the defendant was
detained, indicate that a reasonable person would not have felt free go until they
answered the additional questions. Furthermore, although the questions were not
expressly coercive, the circumstances surrounding the request to search made the request
subtly coercive. Specifically, Officer Huntington had only issued a warning regarding the
lack of insurance and he had not taken any action regarding the improper left turn.
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Therefore, a reasonable person would not have felt that their consent, if given, was a
voluntary act of free will because Officer Huntington could have cited Hansen for the
improper lane change if Hansen was uncooperative regarding the search.").
Because the consent was not proved voluntary, this Court need analyze no further.
See, e.g.. Thurman.
However, the attenuation analysis confirms that suppression is in order. The
police acted in intentional andflagrantdisregard for the constitutional rights of the
suspects in arresting them at gunpoint and searching them without probable cause.
Mallery's purported consent was given in the midst of this police misconduct, and was
not isolated from it by any intervening circumstances. In these circumstances, there was
no lawful consent to justify the search of Mallery or Rosillo, and the trial court should
have ordered all evidence stemmingfromthe unlawful detention of Mallery suppressed.
See Thurman, supra.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION.
In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court
determined that because of the highly unreliable nature of eyewitness identification
testimony, and because of the tendency of jurors to be favorably impressed with such
testimony, despite its weaknesses, under Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution, Utah trial
courts must carefully screen eyewitness identifications for reliability.
The relevant factors for courts to consider in assessing the reliability of eyewitness
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identifications are set forth as follow:
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2)
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly.
Id. at 781 (quoting State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)).
In Mallery's case, the trial court's ruling on the eyewitness identification was as
follows:
Finally, the Court ruled at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing
that the initial show-up and identification of the defendant as one of the two
that were involved in the robbery where Mr. Lund was the victim was
proper. The Court determined that there was no inappropriate suggestion
on the part of the police officers. The victim, Mr. Lund, not only made an
immediate positive identification of the defendant and the co-defendant as
being the persons who robbed him a few moments before at the Ute Car
Wash on 300 East and 300 South, but has remained consistent in that
identification through various court hearings and a line-up after the
defendant's arrest.
(R. 163).
The trial court's analysis was obviously inadequate under Ramirez. He did not
make any ultimate conclusion of reliability, and the only factor he discussed was factor 4,
whether the identification was the product of suggestion and whether Lund had remained
consistent in making the identification (R. 163). Cf. State v. Nelson. 950 P.2d 940, 94243 (Ut. App. 1997)(reversing trial court's denial of motion to suppress eyewitness
identification because the trial court did not hear evidence, discuss the Ramirez reliability
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factors or make afindingof reliability).
Consideration of the first three Ramirez factors counsels against afindingof
reliability. Lund testified that the robbery took a total of about ten to fifteen seconds (R.
272 at 67). While he felt he got a good look at the robbers' faces and focused on them
(R. 272 at 68), the fact that he described Mallery as Hispanic and wearing a dark cap in
his description and then conceded in court that Mallery is Caucasian and was wearing a
red cap demonstrates that he did not pay great attention to their appearance, or did not
have great acuity, or was simply overcome by the stress of the situation.
The factors addressed by the trial court were elucidated by the Ramirez court as
follows:
The fourth reliability factor is whether the witness's identification
was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter or whether it
was a product of suggestion. Here, relevant circumstances include the
length of time that passed between the witness's observation at the time of
the event and the identification of defendant; the witness's mental capacity
and state of mind at the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to
opinions, descriptions, identifications, or other information from other
sources; instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses to the event
failed to identify defendant; instances when the witness or other
eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with
defendant; and the circumstances under which defendant was presented to
the witness for identification.
Id. at 783 (citations omitted).
On both counts addressed, the trial court was clearly erroneous and legally
incorrect.
Infindingthat there was no inappropriate suggestion by the police, the trial court
overlooked the facts that the suspects were cuffed and surrounded and spotlighted by the
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police when the eyewitness arrived (R. 272 at 70-72). He failed to recognize that showups such as occurred here are inherently suggestive. See, e.g., Ramirez, at 777 (show-up
occurred when defendant was sole suspect, handcuffed to chainlink fence and surrounded
by the police, as witnesses viewed him from back seat of police car) and at 784
(indicating concern with blatant suggestiveness of showup).
Of greater significance, he ignored the critical facts which distinguish this case
from all others: before going to the show-up, Lund had been listening to Officer Hawk's
radio, and knew that the police had arrested and searched the two suspects, who were
found to be in possession of his identification and other property (R. 272 at 80). These
trial court'sfindingthat there was no suggestion involved in the showup simply cannot be
reconciled with these facts.
While Lund did consistently identify Mallery in the two police show-ups, at the
line-up and in court, Lund was not consistent in his descriptions of Mallery, whom he
originally incorrectly described as Hispanic and wearing a dark baseball cap (R. 272 at
81). But see Ramirez, supra. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, his description
changed, to add that one suspect was wearing a tan shirt, that both were wearing jeans,
and that the gunman's cap was red (R. 272 at 66).3
In relying on the "positive" nature of Lund's identification, the trial court erred
further, because Ramirez specifically holds that an eyewitness's level of certainty is not a
3

He believed that he had included these facts in his original description until
he listened to the dispatch tape of his description (R. 272 at 79).
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proper factor, in light of empirical studies indicating that at times, the more certain an
eyewitness is, the greater the likilihood is that the witness is incorrect. See Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 781 (recognizing that empirical studies demonstrate that at times, the more certain
an eyewitness is of the identification, the more likely the eyewitness is to be incorrect);
and Ramirez at 781 (listing factors bearing on reliability and noting that eyewitness's
level of certainty is not a relevant consideration in determining suppression of eyewitness
identification under state constitutional analysis).
Concededly, Utah appellate case law has granted trial courts broad discretion to
admit eyewitness identifications despite the suggestiveness of show-ups. See e^g. State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 784 (Utah 1991)(affirming admission of eyewitness identification
testimony despite "troublesome" "blatant suggestiveness of the showup," which was
compounded by the fact that no witness saw the assailant's complete face, on the grounds
that the trial court had the discretion to resolve credibility issues and to assess demeanor
evidence); State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4 at U 7, 20 P.3d 265, 267 (officer took victim to
scene of arrest and shone spotlights on two suspects, one at a time).
However, this case goes beyond all others in the suggestiveness of the show-up,
because prior to the show-up, the victim of the crime was listening to a police radio, and
overheard not only the arrest of the two suspects, but also the fact that the suspects were
found carrying his stolen property. Combined with the suggestive nature of the show-up,
which occurred when the suspects were cuffed and surrounded by multiple police officers
and cars, and spotlighted by the officer accompanying the victim, these facts preclude a
29

finding of reliability of the identification, which was necessarily the product of
suggestion.
The trial court's analysis was inadequate and legally incorrect under the governing
law of Ramirez.
CONCLUSION
The State's case against Mallery consisted of evidence seized in violation of Mr.
Malleiy's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and of constitutionally
unreliable eyewitness identification testimony.
Because this evidence was inadmissible and so completely prejudicial to Mr.
Mallery, this Court should reverse Mallery's conviction and the denials of his motions to
suppress.
DATED this ^ 1

day of December, 2001.
Respectfully submitted:

Richard P. Mauro
Attorney for Mr. Mallery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO. 001914668

:

ANDREW OWENS MALLERY,

:

Defendant.

;

The above-referenced matter was before the Court on April 9,
2001, at 9:00 a.m.

Counsel for the State and the defendant were

present, and the defendant was present.

The Court took evidence

regarding the matters raised in the defendant's Motion to Suppress
Personal and Residential Search, as well as initial identification
of the defendant.

Following the taking of evidence, the Court

heard closing arguments of counsel and ruled on a number of the
issues raised in the defendant's Motion, and took certain portions
of the Motion under advisement.

The Court has reviewed the

evidence, the arguments of counsel and the written submissions, and
being fully advised, enters the following Minute Entry decision.
The Court determined that the search of the residence at 228
South 300 East was with permission of the occupant, and that there
was no constitutional infirmity with regard to that search. During
that search, the victim's wallet and a firearm that matched the
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description of the firearm used in the armed robbery were located.
The Court therefore denied the defendant's Motion to Suppress the
evidence obtained during the search of the residence.
The

Court

defendant's

further

person,

determined

assuming

the

that

the

detention

search
was

of

the

otherwise

appropriate, at the scene of the location where the police officers
stopped the cab in which the defendant and co-defendant were
riding, was with the defendant's consent.
Further, the Court ruled that the initial stop of the cab in
which

the

defendant

appropriate.

and

the

co-defendant

were

riding

was

The Court determined that the officers had at least

an articulable suspicion regarding the occupants of the cab as
being involved in the robbery which they were investigating.
Finally, the Court ruled at the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing

that

the

initial

show-up

and

identification

of the

defendant as one of the two that were involved in the robbery where
Mr. Lund was the victim was proper.

The Court determined that

there was no inappropriate suggestion on the part of the police
officers.

The victim, Mr. Lund, not only made an immediate

positive identification of the defendant and the co-defendant as
being the persons who robbed him a few moments before at the Ute
Car Wash on 300 East and 300 South, but has remained consistent in
that identification through various court hearings and a line-up
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after the defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion
to Suppress the initial identification of him by the victim at the
scene of the stop is denied.
After considering the position of the parties, the Court is
satisfied that the detention and the manner of detention, including
the length of detention of the defendant after the initial stop,
was proper.

The Court determines that not only did the officers

have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to make the initial stop,
but after the defendant was out of the cab, the police not only had
a continued articulable suspicion, but had additional facts to
constitute probable cause so as to believe that the defendant was
involved in the robbery at the Ute Car Wash a few minutes before.
The defendant Mallery was found wearing a baseball cap as was
reported to the police officers.

The defendant matched the build

and height given as identification of the perpetrators of the
robbery, and the defendant came from the immediate area of the
robbery in the cab just a few minutes after the robbery occurred.
The age of both the defendant and the co-defendant Rosillo matched
the description given by the victim, Mr. Lund.

In addition to all

the foregoing that created probable cause for the officers to
believe that the defendant had been involved in a robbery a few
minutes

before

at

the

Ute

Car

Wash,

there

was

additional

information after the defendant voluntarily agreed to have his
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person searched by the police officer, where identification and
other documents relating to the victim, Mr. Lund, were located.
Those documents found in the voluntary search of the defendant's
person serve to increase the quantity of information available to
the police officers to create additional probable cause regarding
the defendant Mallery.
The nature of the detention was reasonable to effect the
purpose of the stop and, taking into account the nature of the
crime

being

investigated,

appropriate as well.

the

manner

of

the

detention

was

The officers detained the defendant and co-

suspect, Rosillo, near the location of the stop to see if they
could be identified by the victim, and such a procedure is proper.
The victim was close and the detention would be of short duration.
The fact that the defendant was handcuffed while being detained by
the police officers, while not usually called for, is appropriate
under the circumstances where a crime being investigated was a
crime involving the use of a firearm.
Accordingly, the defendants complaint that he was improperly
detained after the initial stop in an unreasonable manner for an
unreasonable

length

of

time,

so

as

to

void

the

initial

identification or void the voluntary search of the defendants
person, are without substance and as previously indicated, denied.
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The Court will expect counsel for the State to prepare
detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and an Order
denying the defendant's Motion addressed/not only at the conclusion
of the evidentiary hearing on April 9/2001, but also as set forth
in this Minute Entry decision.
Dated this f^> day of April/2001.

/TIMOTHY R. HANSON
/DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this,

day of April,

2001:

Byron F. Burmester
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Richard P. Mauro
Attorney for Defendant
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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